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Plato and Equality for Women across Social Class 
 
 




This essay will marshal evidence for Plato’s extension of equal education and professional 
opportunity to all women, including artisan women who are not his ideal city’s philosopher-queens. 
I examine the explicit commentary in the Republic, Timaeus, and Laws about women in artisan 
professions, and I link it together with the three of the core principles advanced in the Republic, 
particularly (1) the principle of specialization (R. 369b-370c), (2) the principle of irrelevant 
reproductive differences (R. 454b-e, 456b), and (3) the principle of children’s potential (R. 415a-c, 
423c-d) that arises from the myth of metals. Plato uses his Socrates and the Athenian to argue against 
gender discrimination because it violates these principles. Plato offering a theory of equal opportunity 





I. Do Plato’s Proposals for Sex Equality Extend to Women of the Producer Class?  
 
With the exception of a minority of scholars who ignore or ridicule the proposal1, it 
is generally agreed that in the Republic Plato’s Socrates contends that, like men, women can 
merit inclusion in the elite group of philosopher-monarchs (R. 456a-b, 466c-d; see also R. 
540c).2 Many commentators assume that Plato’s provision of equal education and 
professional opportunity extends only to women with potential to become philosopher-
queens.3 Far less scholarly attention has been paid, however, to the question of whether 
                                                     
1 I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 100, 
Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), and Allan Bloom, 
trans., The Republic of Plato, with Notes and Interpretive Essay (New York: Basic Books, 1968) 
reject the seriousness of Plato’s claims about equality of education and opportunity for women and 
men. See Bluestone, Women and the Ideal Society, for a catalog of such commentators. 
2 See Appendix A.  
3 Crossman, Plato Today, 125; Annas, ‘Plato’s Republic and Feminism’, p. 315; Okin, ‘Philosopher 
Queens’, pp. 359-60; Smith, ‘The Logic of Plato’s Feminism’, pp. 8-9; John Darling, ‘Are Women 
Good Enough? Plato’s Feminism Re-Examined’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 20 (1986), pp. 
123-8, p. 123; Vlastos, ‘Was Plato a Feminist?’, p. 12; Smith, ‘Plato, Irony, and Equality’, p. 46; 





Plato’s proposals for sex equality extend to the artisan women who are not philosopher-
queens.  
The commentators who assume his proposals extend only to philosopher-queens take 
Plato as silent concerning any overhaul of the traditional lives of the artisan class. There is a 
divide among these scholars between those who are bothered by Plato’s alleged exclusion of 
working-class women and those who do not express such a concern. Bluestone is critical of 
scholars who believe equality of education and opportunity are open only to elite women (not 
to female artisans) and who express “no concern that Plato spoke of equality only for an elite 
group”.4 Similarly, Chadwick rightly contends that if Plato only wants equality of 
opportunity for guardian women, he too would be guilty like many present-day feminists of 
elitism—of only being concerned with women of one class.5 I agree that if Plato did think 
equal education and opportunity were only applicable to guardian women, then we ought to 
be troubled by his elitism.  
However, I find myself at odds with those who do not recognize Plato’s extension of 
equal education and opportunity to all women, including artisan women. Bluestone’s 
treatment stands out because she understands clearly that Plato’s principles commit him to 
equality of education and professional opportunity for all women, and she herself notes that 
Averroës reads Plato as extending his proposals about equality for women to the women of 
every class6, but she does not see Plato as extending sex equality to artisans because she takes 
Plato to be totally silent about artisan women.7 I will show that Plato is, in fact, not silent 
about female artisans and Averroës was not mistaken after all when he wrote that for Plato 
                                                     
Natalie Harris Bluestone, Women and the Ideal Society: Plato’s Republic and Modern Myths of 
Gender (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), pp. 72, 85. See also H. D. Rankin, 
Plato and the Individual (London: Methuen, 1964) and Martin, ‘Sex Equality and Education’, pp. 
294, 297. 
4 Bluestone, Women and the Ideal Society, p. 72.  
5 Ruth Chadwick, ‘Feminism and Eugenics: The Politics of Reproduction in Plato’s Republic’, in 
Polis and Politics: Essays in Greek Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Andros Loizou and Harry 
Lesser (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990), pp. 101-10, p. 106.  
6 Natalie Harris Bluestone, ‘Why Women Cannot Rule: Sexism in Plato Scholarship’ in Feminist 
Interpretations of Plato, ed. Tuana, pp. 109-30, pp. 113-4. 
7 Smith, ‘The Logic of Plato’s Feminism’, p. 9; Bluestone, Women and the Ideal Society, p. 18.  





“women are essentially on the same level with men in respect to civic activities in the same 
classes”.8 
If Plato had explored the topic of gender and justice more extensively, it would have 
been easier for Plato’s audience to grasp what Averroës recognizes, that Plato believes what 
is best for the city is for each class to offer girls the same education and professional 
opportunity as their male peers. As I will show, Plato is an early initiator of the rejection of 
gender discrimination, and the project of demonstrating the value of equal education and 
professional opportunity for girls and women across all social classes begins with Plato. 
In section II, I will focus on the status of female artisans in the Laws, Republic, and 
Timaeus. These explicit comments make clear that Plato was indeed considering female 
artisan in the context of his proposals about equal education and professional opportunity. 
This section will examine the central role of theoretical principles in Plato’s thinking about 
women’s work in the Republic. Specifically, as we shall see in this section, the principle of 
specialization (R. 369b-370c) and the principle that reproductive differences are irrelevant to 
non-reproductive occupations (R. 454b-e, 456b) apply as much to female artisans as to the 
elite female guardians. In other words, the logic Plato has Socrates use to defend the need for 
some women to be guardians alongside some men is explicitly applied to all women, even 
those who are not philosopher-queens. 
Next, in Section III I will examine the relevance of a principle that arises in the myth 
of metals, which I refer to as the principle of children’s potential (R. 415a-c, 423c-d). This 
principle, that children are not necessarily of their parents’ ‘metal’, has important 
implications for the educational program of the Republic. The myth of metals takes it for 
granted that a state-sponsored educational program must operate across all classes in order 
to discover each child’s nature and potential contribution to the city’s good. As we shall see, 
state-sponsored professional child-care is necessary for adhering to the principle of 
specialization and the principle of the irrelevance of reproductive difference for non-
reproductive labor. In other words, the myth of metals requires and presumes equal education 
and opportunity across all social classes.  
 
                                                     
8 Averroës Commentary on Plato’s Republic, ed. E.I.J. Rosenthal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1966), 454, p. 164. Emphasis added. 





II. Plato’s extension of equal education and professional opportunity to all women  
 
In both the Laws and Republic Plato explores the status of female artisans as well as 
the benefits that accrue to the state from an educational system that does not discriminate 
based upon sex/gender. Let’s look into Plato’s commentary concerning professional 
opportunity for working-class women.  
Let’s turn first to the Laws, Plato’s final dialogue. There Plato has the Athenian claim 
that all boys and girls should imitate Athena; he writes, “Our boys and girls should imitate 
[Athena’s] example wholeheartedly, and prize the gift which the goddess made them” (L. 
796c; cf. L. 626d). After introducing the notion of imitating Athena, Plato has the Athenian 
advocate for raising all boys and girls the same way (L. 804d-805b), and shortly thereafter 
he reminds us that girls who have not been given equal opportunity with respect to military 
training “wouldn’t be able to take up shield and spear and copy Athena” (L. 806b). Plato 
easily uses Athena’s female warrior status to help him advocate for women to be included in 
the military. And given Athena’s association with wisdom, she persists as a powerful 
patroness for the city of Athens where Plato first advanced the notion that some women could 
be wise enough to lead the city alongside some qualified men (R. 456a-b).  
Yet, we must also remember that Athena is the goddess of craft too. Thus, Plato 
fittingly has the Athenian employ the theme of imitating Athena while recommending that 
“in education and everything else, the female sex should be on the same footing as the male” 
(hôs dei paideias te kai tôn allôn hoti malista koinônein to thêlu genos hemin tôi tôn arrenôn 
genei) (L. 805d; emphasis added). Athena is known as not only the patron goddess of Athens 
but also the patroness of various artisans and crafts, especially weaving (cf. L. 920d).9 In the 
Classical period, there were regular occurrences of the epithet Athena Ergane,10 the patron 
goddess of manual work. So, in the Laws Plato uses the motif of imitating Athena to 
recommend that all little girls be educated and trained alongside their male counterparts, 
whether they will copy Athena with their talent for wisdom, warfare, weaving, or another 
                                                     
9 Cf. Smp. 197b; Prt. 321d-322a; Criti. 109c. See also Pomeroy, Goddesses, pp. 4-5. 
10 Jon D. Mikalson, Athenian Popular Religion (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1983), p. 141 n. 21. 





craft. Thus, Plato’s explicit extension of equal education and professional opportunity to all 
women across social class is evident in the Laws.  
How does this position in the Laws compare to the earlier Republic? Although Plato 
spends much more time on the issue in the Republic and there he relies upon more theoretical 
framework in expressing his position, the position mirrors the extension of equal education 
and professional opportunity for all women expressed in the Laws. Let’s examine the nuances 
of the position taken in the Republic where key principles are established, namely, the 
principle of specialization and the principle of the irrelevance of reproductive difference for 
non-reproductive labor.  
Plato has Socrates claim that cities are founded because people believe that living 
“together as partners and helpers” is best for themselves (R. 369c). From this notion springs 
the Republic’s principle of specialization, that each person should work for the common good 
of all, contributing what each is naturally suited to do (R. 369b-370c). The principle of 
specialization is one of the main political principles governing the political activity of the 
city. At the point where the principle of specialization is introduced, Plato has Socrates 
envision the principle of specialization applying to “each of them” (hêna hekaston toutôn) 
(R. 369e1-2; see also R. 433a, 453b5) in the community rather than only some of the people 
in the community. And later in the Republic he explicitly applies the principle of 
specialization to women not just men (R. 433d) as he holds the principle of specialization up 
as the key ingredient for a just community (R. 433c-e).  
Plato depicts Socrates as keenly aware (R. 450c-d, 452a-c) that the proposals he offers 
in Book V concerning equality for women are likely to be an object of ridicule for those to 
whom they seem “contrary to custom” (R. 452a), and this remains largely true even today. 
Interestingly, Plato has Glaucon encourage Socrates to proceed with his defense, reminding 
him that his “audience isn’t inconsiderate, incredulous, or hostile” (R. 450d). And Socrates 
urges everyone to push past the jokes and the fear of being ridiculed in order to consider 
properly this revolutionary idea, and he highlights how important it is for him to help his 
interlocutors search for the truth on this philosophical matter (R. 450e-451a). Socrates is so 
committed to persuading any doubters that he invites anyone to question them “about whether 
female human nature can share all the tasks of that of the male, or none of them, or some but 
not others” (poteron dunatê phusis hê anthrôpinê hê thêleia têi tou arrenos genous 





koinônêsai eis hapanta ta erga ê oud’ eis hen, ê eis ta men hoi ate, eis de ta ou) (R. 452e-
453a). So, Socrates and Glaucon agree to represent the objections of the doubter (R. 453a-b).  
I disagree with Annas’s claim that Plato does nothing to refute a sex segregationist’s 
objection.11 Plato has Socrates acknowledge the existence of sexual differences between men 
and women only to warn his audience not to get hoodwinked by this fact (R. 454a-b). Socrates 
offers an extended argument that reproductive ability to bear or beget is irrelevant to all non-
procreative endeavors, including but not limited to occupations such as managing the city.  
He writes, “…it’s apparent that they differ only in this respect, that the females bear 
children while the males beget them…” (R. 454d). Sex segregationists fail to see that their 
logic would not only restrict all women to specializing solely in pregnancy, childbirth, and 
breast-feeding; it would also restrict all men from doing another job merely because of their 
ability to beget children. And of course a polis must do more than bear and beget if it is to 
survive.12  
This principle of the irrelevance of sexual differences accounts entirely for why Plato 
believes not only that men and women should share all the work necessary for survival like 
farming, carpentry, and so on, but also that men and women should share the work of raising 
children. In the context of discussing life for the Kallipolis’s guardians, Plato has Socrates 
say: 
You agree, then, that the women and men should associate with one another in education, in things 
having to do with children, and in guarding the other citizens in the way we’ve described; that both 
when they remain in the city and when they go to war, they must guard together and hunt together 
like dogs and share in everything as far as possible; and that by doing so they’ll be doing what’s best 
and not something contrary either to woman’s nature as compared with man’s or to the natural 
association of men and women with one another (R. 466c-d; emphasis added; see also R. 540c.).13 
Plato deserves credit for realizing that qualified women leading alongside their 
qualified male peers is neither unnatural for women themselves nor for the dynamic between 
the sexes. And it is revolutionary even by today’s standards to believe that that gender is 
                                                     
11 Annas, ‘Plato’s Republic and Feminism’, p. 310.  
12 McKeen, ‘Why Women Must Guard’, pp. 533-4.  
13 G. M. A. Grube, trans., Republic, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, in Plato Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), pp. 971-1223. I will rely on Grube’s translation throughout 
this paper.  





irrelevant to the capacity for child-care (R. 460b, 466c).14 Furthermore, just earlier in the 
Republic Plato’s Socrates asserts that state-sponsored professional child-care makes it 
possible for parents to work (R. 460d) and that there should no double standard at all 
concerning the rules of sexual morality (R. 459d, 460d-461c). When Plato’s Socrates 
proclaims that gender is even irrelevant to the job of caring for children (R. 460b, 466c), he 
is introducing what will become a core principle of feminism. As Okin writes, “The real 
significance of the treatment of the woman question in Republic V is that it is one of the very 
few instances in the history of thought when the biological implications of femaleness have 
been clearly separated from all the conventional, institutional, and emotional baggage that 
has usually been identified with them”.15  
After showing that reproductive differences are irrelevant to the work of managing 
the city, Plato has Socrates make a set of claims about women’s professional capacities at 
Republic 455e-456a that merit greater attention. This passage makes explicit that Plato’s 
Socrates envisions women in artisan occupations too, but unfortunately it has been ignored 
by commentators who assume Plato’s proposals extend only to guardians.16 However, 
Martin, Reeve, Santas, Harry and Polansky, and Rowett are exceptions. I join them in seeing 
the tremendous significance of 455e-456a. There Plato has Socrates explicitly indicate that 
some women will have the nature of a doctor (R. 455e), that some women will have the nature 
of a musician (R. 455e), and that some women will be athletic or warriors (R. 455e-456a). 
Given that doctors were typically grouped alongside other craftsmen17, the case of the female 
doctor has special significance here. This passage flatly contradicts Bluestone’s claim that 
Plato “only mentions women’s abilities in connection with those who would be Philosopher-
                                                     
14 Pace Sue Blundell, Women in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 
p. 185, who mistakenly indicates that Plato believes child-care is women’s work. 
15 Okin, ‘Philosopher Queens’, p. 358.  
16 Martin, ‘Sex Equality and Education’, p. 286, C.D.C. Reeve, ‘The Naked Old Women in the 
Palaestra’, in Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays, ed. Richard Kraut (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1997), pp. 129-41, p. 131, Santas, ‘Justice, Law, and Women’, Harry and Polansky, ‘Plato 
on Women’s Natural Ability’, p. 271, and Catherine Rowett, ‘Why the Philosopher Kings Will 
Believe the Noble Lie’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 50 (2016), pp. 67-100, p. 95. Arlene 
Saxonhouse, ‘The Philosopher and the Female in the Political Thought of Plato’, in Feminist 
Interpretations of Plato, ed. Tuana, pp, 67-85, p. 72, does not ignore it but instead contends that this 
part of the text “must be seen as comic in intent.” 
17 Ste. Croix, Class Struggle, p. 271.  





Queens”.18 Here Plato’s Socrates applies what Martin calls the “Postulate of Specialized 
Natures”19—that each person is born with greater capacity for one occupation than for others 
(R. 370a-b)—to all women not just guardian women. So, some women will be apt for 
leadership, while others are fit for soldiering, and still others are suited to be producers.20 
Plato’s principle of specialization tells us that it damages the polis if any individual is 
excluded from the occupation for which his/her nature is suited (R. 433a-b), and his theory 
of justice determines that this harm is unjust. Therefore, Plato recognizes it as unjust when 
gender discrimination bars women from occupations for which they have the appropriate 
nature.  
Beyond Socrates’s mention of women’s capacity for medicine, music, and the 
military, Plato’s Socrates clearly knows his argument also applies to cobbling. He and 
Glaucon have already gone over why all that matters to being a cobbler is having a cobbler’s 
nature rather than any irrelevant physical features such as being long-haired or bald (R. 454c). 
Once they have covered the irrelevance of reproductive difference to the natures fit for ruling, 
medicine, music, and soldiering, it becomes easy to agree that reproductive difference is also 
irrelevant to the nature fit for cobbling. More importantly, reproductive difference would be 
irrelevant to any of the crafts that Plato’s Socrates mentions in the context of the principle of 
specialization: farming, building, weaving, cobbling, and medicine (R. 369d).  
I interpret Plato as a feminist in part because of his “attempts to demonstrate that 
biological differences are irrelevant to all but reproductive activities,” to use Bluestone’s 
words.21 And indeed, Plato has Socrates make that explicit; he writes, “Then there is no way 
of life concerned with the management of the city that belongs to a woman because she’s a 
woman or to a man because he’s a man, but the various natures are distributed in the same 
way in both creatures. Women share by nature in every way of life just as men do…” (ouden 
ara estin…epitêdeuma tôn polin dioikountôn gunaikos dioti gunê, oud’ andros dioti anêr, 
                                                     
18 Bluestone, Women and the Ideal Society, p. 98. 
19 Martin, ‘Sex Equality and Education’, p. 283.   
20 See also Santas, ‘Justice, Law, and Women’, p. 31, Catherine McKeen, ‘Why Women Must Guard 
and Rule in Plato’s Kallipolis’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87 (2006), pp. 527-48, p. 538, and 
Patrick Coby, ‘Minding Your Own Business: The Trouble with Justice in Plato’s Republic’, 
Interpretation, 31 (2003), pp. 37-58, p. 54.  
21 Bluestone, Women and the Ideal Society, p. 95.  





all’ homoiôs diesparmenai hai phuseis en amphoin toin zôoin, kai pantôn men metexei gunê 
epitêdeumatôn kata phusin…) (R. 455d; emphases added). And Republic 455d-e does not 
merely claim that women can have a nature suited for ruling or the military. Most 
commentators have gone wrong by ignoring the evidence at 455e-456a that Plato’s Socrates 
explicitly includes artisan women when he imagines equal professional opportunity for 
women and men. As Martin writes, “…there is in Plato’s Just State…equality of role 
opportunity for men and women: it is possible for members of either sex to be suited by 
nature for the role of artisan, auxiliary, or ruler…”22 Without qualification, Republic 455d-e 
declares that individual women can merit a position alongside individual men in every way 
of life.  
One might object that the physical nature of women as a class (characterized by the 
so-called “average woman”) is not suited for occupations that involve heavy manual labor 
because on average women are smaller and have smaller muscle mass. Plato’s Socrates 
admits that women as a class are physically weaker than men as a class (R. 451e, 455d-e). Of 
course, military service includes tasks with heavy physical demands. Yet, Socrates insists 
that at least some women will have a nature suitable even for physically demanding work (R. 
455e-456a). Thus, there is nothing about being a woman that rules out having the capacity 
for physically demanding work. At most, a higher percentage of men will be suitable for such 
jobs. Furthermore, earlier Socrates, Adeimantus, and Glaucon discuss the weakness of some 
bodies making them a better fit for retail work (R. 371c-d). That passage does not specify 
gender, but the interlocutors are either thinking of all people or they are defaulting to think 
of men. So, it is important to note that at Republic 371c-d they appear as interested in the 
physical weakness of male bodies as they are in the physical weakness of female bodies as a 
disqualifier for certain jobs.  
The interlocutors can acknowledge that women as a class are physically weaker than 
men as a class without contradicting the claim that being a woman does not by itself 
disqualify anyone for any type of job. What is crucial here is the ability to distinguish between 
individual women and women as a class. And it is Glaucon who astutely introduces that 
important distinction. At 455d, Plato has Glaucon say, “It’s true that one sex is much superior 
                                                     
22 Martin, ‘Sex Equality and Education’, p. 286.  





to the other in pretty well everything, although many women are better than many men in 
many things.” As a result of this, Glaucon rejects the notion that all occupations should be 
assigned to men (R. 455e). At that point, Socrates discusses women with natures of doctors, 
musicians, athletes/warriors, and philosophers (R. 455e-456a). One of the most fundamental 
aspects of Plato’s feminism is this recognition that an individual woman may have any nature 
that an individual man could have, be it that of a political leader, a warrior, a doctor, a 
musician, a cobbler, a carpenter, etc.  
It is on account of their ability to see the various possible natures for individual 
women (and men) that Socrates and Glaucon conclude that “we’re not legislating 
impossibilities or indulging in mere wishful thinking, since the law we established is in 
accord with nature. It’s rather the way things are at present that seems to be against nature” 
(R. 456c). Here Plato has Socrates put to rest the concerns Polemarchus and Glaucon raised 
over this “first wave” of opposition to his proposals of equal education and opportunity for 
women and men. Although Annas claims that Plato does not present the inequality of the 
sexes in Athens as an injustice23, I interpret this critical comment about “the way things are 
at present” as an indication that Plato’s Socrates believes the conventional treatment of 
women in ancient Athens fails to meet the standard of justice he lays out in the Republic.  
Furthermore, introducing the crafts of medicine and music in his discussion begins to 
open the door to consideration of activities that require skill beside physical strength. Harry 
and Polansky take the most important aspect of Plato’s project to be his effort to “limit the 
significant natural differences between males and females to body-type”.24 It is helpful that 
Plato has Socrates include weaving when talking about the occupations the city needs. While 
not solely performed by women, women are frequently associated with weaving (see R. 
455c); so in explaining the principle of specialization, Plato’s Socrates even gives one 
instance of an artisan occupation that already involved women. Consequently, when Plato 
has Socrates conclude in the Republic that women and men share in every way of life, it 
should be interpreted as an endorsement of equal education and training even for artisan 
                                                     
23 Annas, ‘Plato’s Republic and Feminism’, p. 314.  
24 Harry and Polansky, ‘Plato on Women’s Natural Ability’, p. 263.  





women. Discussing women’s participation in every way of life would be rather strange if 
Plato only had ruling and the military in mind.  
Finally, a passage at Timaeus 18c shores up this reading. Although the Timaeus’s 
brief attempt at a summary of the Republic’s conversation (set dramatically on the prior day) 
is not at all thorough, it reinforces Republic 455e-456a. There Plato has Socrates say, “And 
in fact we even made mention of women. We said that their natures should be made to 
correspond with those of men, and that all occupations, whether having to do with war or 
with the other aspects of life, should be common to both men and women” (ta epitêdeumata 
panta koina kata te polemon kai kata tên allên diaitan doteon pasais) (Ti. 18c; emphasis 
added).25 Here Plato’s Socrates takes it as an established conclusion of their discussion in the 
Republic that indeed all occupations would be open to both men and women. This passage 
adds force to my claim that Plato’s position in the Republic mirrors that of the Laws, which 
holds that all professions should be open to both men and women, not just guarding but all 
others too (L. 829e, 882c). 
Having examined the applicability of the principle of specialization and the principle 
of the irrelevance of sexual difference to non-reproductive work, let us now draw out the 
consequences of linking these principles to the the myth of metals.  
 
III. Connecting the Principle of Specialization and the Myth of Metals 
 
After the interlocutors question how guardians will be selected, Plato has Socrates 
introduce the myth of metals to make a radical proposal about equal opportunity for all. They 
agree that guardians will be appointed from the pool of young people who succeed when 
tested “as a child, youth, and adult” (R. 413e-414a). The thorough testing they have in mind 
for guardians looks for graciousness in everything, rhythm and harmony, resistance to being 
“put under a spell,” and being a good guardian of oneself and the music and poetry one has 
learned (R. 413d-e). However, they confess that they have not gone through the details of 
this selection process (R. 414a). Socrates then tells an old Phoenician story that he thinks it 
would be difficult to get people to believe. Plato writes: 
                                                     
25 Donald J. Zeyl, trans., Timaeus, in Plato Complete Works, ed. Cooper, pp. 1224-91. 





‘All of you in the city are brothers,’ we’ll say to them in telling our story, ‘but the god who made you 
mixed some gold into those who are adequately equipped to rule, because they are most valuable. He 
put silver in those who are auxiliaries and iron and bronze in the farmers and other craftsmen. For the 
most part you will produce children like yourselves, but, because you are all related, a silver child 
will occasionally be born from a golden parent, and vice versa, and all the others from each other. So 
the first and most important command from the god to the rulers is that there is nothing that they must 
guard better or watch more carefully than the mixture of metals in the souls of the next generation. If 
an offspring of theirs should be found to have a mixture of iron or bronze, they must not pity him in 
any way, but give him the rank appropriate to his nature and drive him out to join the craftsmen and 
farmers. But if an offspring of these people is found to have a mixture of gold or silver, they will 
honor him and take him up to join the guardians or the auxiliaries…’ (R. 415a-c; emphasis added).  
At the heart of the myth of metals is the concept that a child’s nature cannot be 
inferred from the parents’ nature. I call this the principle of children’s potential. Children 
each have their own nature and potential, which is not necessarily the same as their parents’. 
Consequently, the myth takes a program for equal education and opportunity across social 
class as an established necessity. Yet, it has been a struggle for his audience to pick up on the 
true nature of Plato’s project in the myth of metals, which focuses on the centrality of equal 
opportunity for a just society. 
Here I aim to illuminate the radical nature of Plato’s vision of equal opportunity. I 
concur with Rowett that the myth “is designed to deliver greater fairness and equality of 
opportunity, to prevent prejudice or privilege arising from noble birth or wealth or any other 
unfair advantages, and to facilitate social mobility”.26 With this in mind, let’s examine Plato’s 
Socrates’s assertion of the principle of children’s potential in the myth of metals, which has 
important implications for both child-care and education throughout the city. 
Long after the myth of metals we learn that the babies born to guardians will be raised 
in a rearing pen staffed by the men and women who have the nature best suited for child-care 
(R. 460b-d), as I mentioned in Section II. Plato has Socrates say very little about even the 
guardian rearing pen, and he does not explicitly describe the system for nurturing babies born 
to the producer class. Yet, there are two reasons for Plato to regard professional child-care 
and education for the children of all classes as beneficial for the city. First, it establishes a 
venue for identifying the specialized natures of all children (especially the girls born to 
producers) so they can be trained to make their specialized contributions to the community. 
Second, it protects the city from being denied the specialized contribution of nearly half the 
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artisan adults, typically the mothers. Let’s examine these twin benefits of state-sponsored 
child-care and education in turn. 
First, it benefits the polis if those whose nature is suited for caring for and testing 
children have a way to access and identify all children with guardian potential. Conversely, 
it harms the polis if these experts do not have access to all children with the nature suited to 
leadership. The myth of metals includes the principle of children’s potential, that an 
individual’s potential contribution to the community cannot be inferred from the parents’ 
nature (R. 415a-c, 423c-d). So, even if Plato’s Socrates’s concern were only for the guardians 
(as is believed by those with whom I am generally disagreeing in this essay), then he would 
require the existence of a state-provisioned rearing pen for the offspring of producers because 
future guardians (‘gold’ or ‘silver’ babies) can be found among the offspring of ‘iron and 
bronze’ people. If Plato envisions the offspring of the producer class remaining cloistered at 
home being brought up entirely by their parents, then the guardians who are experts at 
recognizing potential guardians would not be able to discover systematically and 
subsequently train the children with guardian potential. If these children with leadership 
potential go undiscovered, then the city will suffer from the loss of their contributions, 
violating the principle of specialization. So, the principle of children’s potential would 
command that the guardians who are experts at discovering children’s natures be able to 
interact with all children, especially as they play (R. 536e-537a). Having the producer 
children cared for and educated by the expert staff at a state-sponsored center would enable 
the experts to ensure each child is given the education and opportunities relevant to his/her 
specific individual nature. Thus, the prospect of methodically finding ‘gold’ or ‘silver’ babies 
in the producer nursery is an important motivation to have producers’ children receive care 
and education outside the home in a state-sponsored rearing pen. 
Plato’s Socrates does not explicitly construct a rearing pen for artisans’ babies. 
However, earlier at Republic 415b-c and 423c-d, Plato suggests that some artisans’ babies 
will join the guardians’ babies at that rearing pen for gold-natured babies. There is nothing 
in the Republic to suggest there could not be a rearing pen for the producers’ offspring. 
Whether it were a communal rearing pen for all babies or separate rearing pens oriented by 
parents’ social class, such an institution would be an ideal location for testing the artisans’ 
children for guardian potential. In fact, Plato’s Socrates mysteriously alludes to the existence 





of a separate rearing pen when he tells Glaucon there will be another place, “secret and 
unknown” to guardians, for “the children of inferior parents, or any child of the others that is 
born defective” (R. 460c). Does this mean that there is one state-provided care center for 
guardians’ babies as well as the children of the ‘bronze’ and ‘iron’ who eventually exhibit 
‘gold’ or ‘silver’ natures and a separate state-provided care center for producers’ babies as 
well as the children of other metals who eventually exhibit ‘iron’ or ‘bronze’ natures? 
Perhaps. If there is a rearing pen experience for producer children, then the guardian rearing 
experts could care for and test these babies and children and transfer those with guardian 
potential to the guardian rearing pen, in accord with Socrates’s remarks at 415b-c and 423c-
d. Interestingly, in the Timaeus’s summary of the Republic conversation Plato gives no details 
but appears to presume two parallel child-care centers when he has Socrates indicate that the 
inferior babies who were “secretly handed on to another city” “should be constantly watched 
as they grew up, so that the ones that turned out deserving might be taken back again and the 
ones they kept who did not turn out that way should change places with them” (Ti. 19a). 
Spelman agrees with me that Plato’s Socrates must envision some education and 
testing of artisan children, even though he does not explicitly announce a producer-class 
rearing pen in the Republic. Spelman writes, “All children will receive the same initial 
education (there is no way of telling at birth what kind of nature a person has, so all should 
be educated up to the point at which differences among them emerge), but only those who 
pass such tests can be established as philosopher-rulers (Republic 414a, 503a)”.27 In contrast, 
Meyer presumes that there is not a mechanism in the Kallipolis for making good on the 
promise that every child with a guardian nature will be discovered and assigned to the 
guardian class.28 She writes:  
…unless the entire population of the city receives this training—the children of artisans and guardians 
alike—these testing institutions are insufficient to make good on the promise made to the artisans in 
the Myth of Metals. However, while it is clear enough that the offspring of the auxiliaries and 
guardians receive this education and have their mettle tested in this way, Socrates gives no indication 
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that any offspring of the artisans will receive it, and as much as says that they do not receive it (405a-
b; cf. 456d).29  
I take Meyer’s point that it would be reasonable for Plato’s Socrates to design 
institutions to test the potential of producer offspring, and she is correct that in constructing 
the city Plato’s Socrates does not explicitly establish a producer-class education and testing 
center. However, I see no indication at any point in the Republic—even at 405a-b—that 
Plato’s Socrates rules out the child-rearing expert guardians being in a position to observe all 
children, including artisan children, at play, discovering their natures and testing their mettle, 
and as I have indicated, there are hints to this effect. 
Furthermore, having a producer-class nursery in addition to the one for the guardians 
will protect the producers’ daughters in particular from missing their opportunity to have 
their guardian potential recognized and cultivated. State-provisioned care and education 
could better ensure that girls receive the same education and professional training as their 
male counterparts, compared to the arrangement of children being educated at home, where 
the commitment to girls’ education is not guaranteed. Later in life Plato writes into the Laws 
that parents should not control their children’s education, the state should.30 If the Kallipolis’s 
program did not include education for the girls and boys of the producer class, then the 
producers’ daughters would not be assured the chance to receive the same education as their 
male peers, given the already-existing bias that boys are more valuable and capable. Again, 
even if Plato were only concerned with the children who have guardian potential, he would 
still need a meticulous way to identify and educate all potential guardians born to producers, 
not just among their sons.31 Meyer underestimates Plato’s commitment to discovering the 
would-be philosopher-monarchs who are so incredibly needed by the city. 
Of course, we must bear in mind that even when girls get an ‘equal’ education with 
their male peers, this does not mean that all children are given the same upbringing. As Santas 
writes, “And since those who share the same pursuits should share the same education, men 
and women of the same pursuits should have the same education, and men and women of 
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different pursuits should have different educations; just as men who have different pursuits 
should have different educations, and women who share the same pursuits should have the 
same education”.32 However, if there were no provision of care and education for the children 
of the producer class through something like a producer rearing pen33, then producers’ 
daughters would be especially vulnerable to being denied the opportunity to contribute to the 
good of the polis.  
Let’s turn now to the second reason for Plato to require a state-sponsored child-care 
system involving all classes. State-sponsored child-care and education play an interesting 
role in Plato’s vision of women’s work because it is not only the venue for discovering 
children’s potential but also the mechanism for enabling all adults who are parents to work 
and contribute to their society (R. 460d).  
In approaching the second reason, let’s think about the domestic arrangements he has 
Socrates announce. Whereas Socrates tells Adeimantus that there will be a dissolution of 
nuclear families for the guardians (R. 423e-424a) and that guardians will not be allowed any 
private currency or property (R. 416d-e, 464b), Plato has Socrates suggest that producers 
retain their private residences (R. 417a), which implies preservation of nuclear families. How 
does the notion of a producer-class rearing pen square with producers having nuclear families 
in private homes? If Plato did not have Socrates require a rearing pen for producer children 
for at least part of the day34, then consequently at least one parent (usually presumed to be 
                                                     
32 Gerasimos Santas, Understanding Plato’s Republic (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 113.   
33 Glenn R. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 130-1, describes mandatory, state-run education in the Laws as 
perhaps Plato’s greatest innovation. 
34 Perhaps the producer-class rearing pen, unlike the one for guardians, is not necessarily for boarding. 
Children with artisan potential, who are cared for and educated at a producer-class rearing pen, could 
possibly return to their families at the end of the day. At R. 415b-c, Plato has Socrates tell us that the 
children of guardians who, unlike their biological parents, have artisan potential instead should be 
driven “out to join the craftsmen and farmers.” An important question arises about these transferred 
children. They would not have biological families among the producer class, although the myth 
claims all people are related (R. 415a-b). Would the producer-class rearing pen have some children 
boarding full-time in lieu of a nuclear family experience? Or would the lack of unity therein be 
problematic enough for Plato to require that none of the children at this rearing pen go home to their 
private residences at the end of the day? Or would he require a system of welcoming those transferred 
children into producer families through adoption? Plato did not have Socrates get far enough into 
these details of life in the Kallipolis for us to understand his picture of life for iron or bronze offspring 
from gold or silver parents. 





the mother) would be needed to care for and educate the children at home. Okin presumes 
that producer’s wives must stay home with children because the private home and nuclear 
family are intact in that segment of the city, and consequently she concludes that Plato does 
not extend equality to producer women.35 Okin bases her conclusion here about the Kallipolis 
limiting producers’ wives to being home-makers on the existence of private residences for 
producers. However, if, as Okin suspects, mothers are expected to focus on child-rearing (as 
has almost always been the case in the past as well as in the present), then being kept from a 
specialized occupation would violate both the principle of the irrelevance of reproductive 
differences for non-reproductive labor and the principle of specialization, which as I have 
already demonstrated, Plato’s Socrates explicitly extends to all women (R. 369e, 433d). 
Plato’s Socrates would reject this as unjust. 
In the Laws, Plato has the Athenian lament what a disaster it is for the community to 
leave women’s contributions untapped. He exclaims, “I maintain that if these results can be 
achieved, the state of affairs in our corner of Greece, where men and women do not throw all 
their energies into the same activities, is absolutely stupid. Almost every state, under present 
conditions, is only half a state, and develops only half its potentialities, whereas with the 
same cost and effort, it could double its achievement. Yet what a staggering blunder for a 
legislator to make!” (L. 804d-805b).36 Without a state-sponsored child-care and education 
system that reaches all children across class, the Kallipolis would be deprived of the talents 
of a slightly smaller segment of the community than the full half mentioned in the Laws. 
Producer mothers would be denied the chance to offer their specialized talent to the polis. If 
there were not a rearing pen for the producers’ babies and children, then regardless of which 
parent would be responsible for child-care and education, the parent’s obligations to the 
child(ren) would supplant the ability to contribute to the community through a producer 
specialization, such as being a doctor, cobbler, or weaver. 
To avoid this, the producer class could maintain private families and simultaneously 
have both parents contribute their special talents to the community if the state organizes a 
care and educational center for their children like the one that frees up guardians for their 
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work. Hence, the second reason for Plato to consider a producer-class rearing pen necessary 
is that only with such a center can the principle of specialization be properly applied to every 
adult in the community instead of excluding half of all producer parents. In this way, the 
necessity to adhere to the principle of specialization empowers producer women to pursue a 
specialized occupation in addition to having children. 
One final issue remains for consideration concerning Plato’s treatment of artisan 
women. What type of education do the girls and women with artisan potential receive? To 
answer this question, we must assess how fine-grained Plato’s conception of an artisan’s 
nature is. Republic 455b-c defines what it means to have a particular nature, concentrating 
on the ability to learn easily and independently. Do the same women who will learn carpentry 
easily and independently learn medicine easily and independently? Even though Bluestone 
generally denies that women of the artisan class would be given equal education and 
opportunity in the scheme of the Republic, she does admit that “if we are ‘presuming’ on the 
basis of his total view, we would have to presume that potters’ wives would also have to do 
whatever their nature fitted them for. If they had an aptitude for pottery and instead did only 
weaving, this, in Plato’s view, would be unjust”.37 Despite my overall disagreement with 
Bluestone, I agree with her here that, for Plato, a potter’s nature differs from a weaver’s.  
However, Plato complicates his position when he has Socrates and Glaucon agree 
that it will not do “great harm to the city” “if a carpenter attempts to do the work of a cobbler, 
or a cobbler that of a carpenter, or they exchange their tools or honors with one another, or if 
the same person tries to do both jobs, and all other such exchanges are made” (R. 434a). One 
might object that this indicates the interlocutors’ rejection of the fine-grained picture of 
artisan natures. Instead, we can discern from this that when producers are not doing the craft 
for which their talent is greatest there is some harm done to the city; it’s just that Plato depicts 
Socrates and Glaucon as tolerant of the small harm. This comes down to their view that 
leadership has higher stakes than the producers’ crafts; so the harm would not be tolerable in 
the context of soldiering or ruling. Nonetheless, Republic 434a tells us Plato believes 
producers have natures for specific trades, rather than a general producer nature that could 
be interchangeably applied to various producer crafts without any harm at all done to the 
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community. So, when we learn that women deserve equal role opportunity even in the artisan 
class, we should know that their particular artisan natures need to be deciphered to determine 
the appropriate artisan profession through which they could make their best contribution to 




In light of textual support, I have argued for Plato’s extension of equal education and 
professional opportunity to all women across social class, including artisan women. Scholars 
like N. Smith and Bluestone have suspected that Plato’s principles should make him extend 
equal education and professional opportunity to artisan women.38 Yet, we have now seen that 
Plato’s Socrates has an explicit vision of extending equal education and professional training 
to women across social class. To defend my reading, I drew attention to Plato’s explicit 
writing in the Laws, Republic, and Timaeus about female artisans, which has been neglected. 
Furthermore, I showed that extending equal education and professional opportunity to all 
women across social class is required by Plato’s theory of justice and its attendant principles, 
such as the principle of specialization, the principle that reproductive differences are 
irrelevant to non-reproductive work, and the principle in the myth of metals concerning 
children’s potential. Plato’s meritocratic vision explicitly applies these principles to female 
artisans as well as to the elite female guardians. Plato uses his Socrates and the Athenian to 
argue explicitly against gender discrimination because such discrimination harms the city by 
violating the principles (1) of specialization, (2) of the irrelevance of reproductive difference 
to non-reproductive work, and, (3) of children potentially having different natures than their 
parents. Plato particularly emphasizes the civic value of eliminating gender discrimination. 
Even with the evidence I have marshalled here, it is fair to wish Plato would have 
made his commitment to equal education and professional opportunity for all women across 
social class even more obvious. Why did he not spend more time in the dialogues making his 
position about gender and justice even clearer? Plato may have considered equal education 
and professional opportunity for artisan women less important to address at length because 
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it was less controversial than the idea of female leadership in politics and the military, given 
that women were already involved in trades and professions, including medicine. It was 
already more typical to see artisan women outside the home, working the fields or trading in 
the agora, as they were less segregated than elite women.39 So, Plato may have assumed he 
should direct his attention toward equality of education and opportunity for women who 
would be community leaders instead, given what a completely alien concept that was to his 
audience. In focusing on guardian women Plato makes rational, courageous, temperate 
women seem more conceivable and real, which is still imperative even now. Furthermore, 
Plato may have thought it was less important to be clearer about artisan women needing the 
same opportunities as artisan men if he considered it a conclusion that would follow easily 
once guardian women were established. 
Given his belief that women could have talents for pursuits from which they were 
barred, Plato was a true visionary.40 Plato offering a theory of equal opportunity for women 
across all classes ought to be highlighted as one of the central achievements of the Republic. 
How extraordinary that Plato managed to imagine female leaders under the material 
conditions of an Athens that did not formally educate girls, that tended to constrain elite 
women and girls except where sanctioned by work41 or religion42, that typically married off 
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fourteen- or fifteen-year-old girls to older husbands they did not necessarily choose43, that 
prohibited women from competing in the Olympic games, fighting in the military, voting, 
judging, or joining the Assembly, and that counted no women as property owners, managers, 
or independent inheritors.44  
Nevertheless, scholars have spilled a great deal of ink over whether Plato ought to be 
considered a feminist.45 Even those of us who believe Plato is something like what one would 
today call a feminist are given pause due to the misogynist comments included at many points 
in his dialogues (R. 360a-b, 398e, 395c-e, 431b-c, 455b, 469d-e, 549c-e, 557c, 563b, 605c-
e; L. 637c, 669c, 694d-e, 731d, 774c-d, 781a, 794e, 836e, 944c; Phd. 60a, 117d-e; Alc. 121d; 
Ti. 42b-c, 76d, 90e, 91a-e; Tht. 176; M. 71e; Cra. 392b-d). These misogynist comments and 
his lack of commitment to reproductive choice in particular and freedom in general put 
serious strain upon arguments for the feminist nature of Plato’s proposals for sexual equality, 
state-sponsored professional child-care, and educating and employing women alongside their 
male peers. With respect to those misogynist comments I agree with Levin, who argues that 
the corpus’s misogynist comments typically do not coincide with remarks about the nature 
of women, from which we can infer that Plato did not take any particular shortcomings as 
irremediable.46 Nevertheless, it is fair to say, as Pomeroy has, that “not even Plato was 
capable of considering women as the true equals of men”.47  
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Given what we know now about how the human brain operates, it should not surprise 
us that the first philosopher to critique gender discrimination and to defend sexual equality, 
equal education and opportunity for girls and women, and the implementation of state-
sponsored professional child-care simultaneously had prejudice against women. Whether the 
dialogues’ misogynist remarks disqualify Plato’s revolutionary proposals from making him 
philosophy’s first feminist remains a topic for debate, largely dependent upon how one 
defines feminism.48 Ultimately I agree with Vlastos’s call for considering Plato more 
remarkable not less so on account of transcending his own misogynist bias in order to arrive 
at his radical proposals about women and gender.49 My hope is that this essay helps Plato’s 
readers better appreciate his ground-breaking vision of extending equal education and 
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